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 The purpose of this article is to make some of the subtler aspects of epistemology 
immediately relevant to counselor educators by clarifying important epistemological issues 
without distorting or oversimplifying them. This is a challenge that we hope proves to be of 
immediate value since the current lack of discourse on conceptual aspects of pedagogy in 
counselor education is of concern (see Korcuska, 2016). We approach this topic from the stance 
that constructivism and phenomenology serve as distinct epistemological lenses through which 
to view the process of learning. We clarify some tenets of constructivism as a response to 
positivism and indicate how phenomenology not only fits into this epistemological debate but 
uniquely serves the interest of counselor preparation. By providing a clear description of 
epistemological issues within constructivism and phenomenology, we hope to engage the 
counselor education community in a rigorous discussion on the merits of phenomenology as a 
unique and valuable pedagogical enterprise (Wilkinson & Dewell, 2019; Wilkinson & Hanna, 
2016). 
The Growth of Constructivism in Education 
 For the past thirty years, constructivism has played an increasingly important role in 
educational theory, research, and practice (Confrey & Kazak, 2006).  It has evolved rapidly and 
extensively from its beginnings in the cognitively-oriented genetic epistemology of Piaget (1954) 
and culturally-oriented social learning theory of Vygotsky (1965) to incorporate the works of 
Halliday (Pritchard & Woollard, 2010; Wells, 1994), Maturana (Cunningham, 1992; Proulx, 
2008), and Dewey (Hickman, Neubert, & Reich, 2009; Johnston, 2009; Prawat & Floden, 1994). 
While this variety of unique perspectives has resulted in the development of numerous 
instructional practices (e.g., scaffolding; guided instruction) and teaching approaches (e.g., 
constructionism; problem-based learning), constructivism remains intimately connected to the 
broadly encompassing notion that “communication and understanding are a matter of interpretive 
construction on the part of experiencing subjects” (von Glaserfeld, 1981, p. 194). This statement 
is general enough to encompass constructivism in its cognitive, social, radical, and critical forms 
as applied to such diverse areas as mathematics education (Confrey & Kazak, 2006; Ernst, 1998; 
Lochhead, 1991), science education (Bachtold, 2013; Dorion, 2010; Tobin, 1993), instructional 
technology (Duffy & Jonassen, 1992; Karagiorgi & Symeou, 2005; Payne, 2009), educational 
psychology (Prawat & Floden, 1994; Pritchard & Woollard, 2010; Tobias, 2010), and counselor 
education (Guiffrida, 2005; McAuliffe & Eriksen, 1999).  
 Constructivist teaching methods emerged to deal with important concerns regarding 
traditional educational approaches, particularly surrounding those teacher-centered instructional 
practices that regard learners as passive recipients of information (Pegues, 2007). The 
constructivist movement has effectively shifted educational discourse in a learner-centered 
direction, making student needs and considerations a central educational priority. For counselor 
educators, the foundation of a constructivist epistemology is that learners uniquely construct, 
rather than gather or acquire, knowledge (Nelson & Neufeldt, 1998). This is an intuitively 
appealing perspective because it corresponds with the clear distinction between learner-centered 
and instructor-centered practices. However, it is also important to recognize that constructivist 
practices rest upon a specific set of epistemological assumptions that are all too often left 
unquestioned (Phillips, 1995; Tobias & Duffy, 2009).  
 There is immense value in aligning pedagogical practices with epistemological 
assumptions insofar as reconciling the two enhances the soundness of our teaching methods 
(Kirschner, 2009). We contend that a basic grasp of epistemological concepts is a prerequisite for 
developing an ideologically-sound teaching approach. Our intention is to clarify why this is 
particularly important in counselor education, as well as to show how a phenomenological 
pedagogy can provide a valuable supplementary approach to constructivist methods. To address 
these ideas, this article will clarify and evaluate the epistemological tenets of constructivism in 
contrast to phenomenology and demonstrate their relative impact on learners in counselor 
education.  
Epistemological Foundations of Constructivism and Phenomenology 
 Epistemology is the study of knowledge and knowledge justification. As an epistemology, 
constructivism serves as an explanation for the nature of knowing rather than as an educational 
theory of learning principles (Schunk, 2012). However, its epistemological stance has distinct 
implications for educational practice. The constructivist position is that learners uniquely 
construct, rather than gather or acquire, knowledge. In terms of educational practice, this means 
that knowledge is not “out there” in the world to be discovered. Rather, it is constructed within 
subjective experience and is contextualized in terms of social or communal meaning-making 
(Bredo, 2006). Phenomenology takes a very different position, maintaining that knowledge is 
directly acquired by observing and apprehending phenomena in our immediate experience 
(Husserl, 1970). For educational practice, this means that there is indeed a discoverable world 
“out there” and that we can refine the accuracy of our knowledge of how it is given to us in 
consciousness by rigorously investigating our direct experience of phenomena. 
 The distinction is crucial because any presumption as to what constitutes knowledge is 
intimately linked to our decision-making process as educators. Our beliefs as to how students 
learn has a direct impact on how we think about, design, and implement a sound teaching 
approach (Kirschner, 2009). In other words, our epistemological assumptions influence our 
teaching practices regardless of whether or not we have thoughtfully considered the topic of 
epistemology. To clarify the essential implications of the issue at hand, the following sections 
define and explore the epistemological tenets that ground constructivism and phenomenology. 
Points of consideration include how each view justifiable beliefs and valid truth claims in 
relation to the principles of coherentism and foundationalism, as well as the consequences of 
these views in regard to subjective experience and the realism-idealism distinction. 
Justifiable Beliefs: Between Coherentism and Foundationalism 
 A primary constructivist position involves replacing truth as an absolute process within an 
absolute reality with the notion of truth as relative inquiry-in-practice (Kirschner, 2009; Schunk, 
2012). This distinction parallels, and is partially derived from, the longstanding debate in 
philosophy over what justifies truth claims, or propositions that one holds to be true (for a 
review, see Feldman, 2003). The constructivist position most closely aligns with epistemological 
coherentism, as rooted in Quine’s (1990) studies of ontological relativism. Coherentism holds 
that a belief is justified when it is supported by other justifiable beliefs in such a manner as to 
establish a coherent belief structure (Lehrer, 2010). This means that all personal beliefs are 
constructed upon other personal beliefs in a continuous cycle, ad infinitum. In practical terms, it 
means that belief structures require only internal consistency, rather than objective evidence, to 
be justified. As such, personal beliefs cannot be legitimately questioned so long as those beliefs 
are part of a coherently structured belief system and there is no conflict among existing beliefs 
within the mental construction (Feldman, 2003; Lehrer, 2010).  
 Coherentism stands in stark contrast to foundationalism, which holds that a belief is 
justified only when it corresponds with a verifiable basis of evidential truth (Alston, 2010). In 
foundationalism, such evidence aligns with the scientific agenda of positivism, or the idea that 
there are logical, empirical, or otherwise discoverable grounds to all truth claims. As such, 
foundationalism is the epistemological basis for “traditional” teaching approaches that suggest 
justified beliefs must be supported by direct and verifiable evidence. Alternatively, coherentism 
reflects a relativistic epistemological stance that belief justification is context-dependent, or 
grounded in personal and historical situations (Lehrer, 2010). So, whereas foundationalism aligns 
with the so-called “modernist” view that human beings as rational subjects can arrive at clearly 
delineated truths about the world, coherentism aligns with the so-called “postmodernist” notion 
that human beings are not rational subjects who discover the world as it is, but are interpreters 
who craft unique and context-dependent meanings about the world (Susen, 2015).  
 However, there remains a third position to consider. Foundherentism - a hybrid term that 
merges foundationalism and coherentism - asserts that a belief is justified when it is both 
supported by direct and verifiable evidence and aligns within a coherent belief structure (Haack, 
1993). It thus embraces both the foundationalist view that verifiable experience is a necessary 
condition for justified beliefs and the coherentist view that justified beliefs exist within context-
dependent systems. However, it denies the more extreme positions of both foundationalism (i.e.; 
justifiable beliefs must be based upon fundamental truths) and coherentism (i.e.; there are no 
fundamental truths, only coherent belief structures). Numerous scholars have argued that 
phenomenology adheres to neither foundationalism nor coherentism (see Føllesdal, 1988; Hopp, 
2008; Zahavi, 2003), insofar as Husserl “takes adequate and conclusive truth as a regulative 
ideal, that is, a goal attainable only in infinite endeavor” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 67). As such, truth is 
neither “out there” in the so-called “external world” waiting to be discovered, nor an 
undiscoverable subjective construction. Instead, the world and the subject are indistinguishable 
due to intersubjective constitution (Husserl, 1931; also see Zaner, 1970).  
 Although the term intersubjective constitution sums up a complicated set of ideas and 
arguments, its implications related to foundherentism is simple to grasp via comparison to other 
epistemologies. Foundationalism claims that a belief is justified when it is grounded in basic 
beliefs that correspond with the reality of the external world, thereby presupposing that the 
external world is directly accessible to knowing subjects. Coherentism asserts that a belief is 
justified when it is part of a coherent system of beliefs, presupposing that the world is not 
directly accessible to the knowing subject. Foundherentism, as an epistemological basis for 
phenomenology, claims that a belief is justified when the knowing subject directly experiences 
the external world and then compares her observations with other knowing subjects, thereby 
presupposing that there is indeed a directly accessible external world but that the observations of 
individual subjects may vary (Haack, 1993). As such, a basic belief is justified only insofar as it 
accurately corresponds with descriptive observations made by other knowing subjects. It is this 
critical reconciliation of evidence-seeking in foundationalism with contextual mutuality in 
coherentism that allows phenomenology to bridge the gap between constructivism and 
positivism.  
 The phenomenological approach provides a means to enhance counselor preparation 
methods because its fits naturally between coherentism and foundationalism. Again, this is 
apparent when comparing positivist, constructivist, and phenomenological approaches to 
instruction. The positivist educator assumes that there are verifiably correct answers to problems, 
provides learners with those answers to build correct knowledge, and tests learners to ensure 
ideas have been accurately retained. Grounded in foundationalism, learners are viewed, so to 
speak, as “intellectual sponges” into which knowledge can be fluidly transferred. The 
constructivist educator assumes that there are few correct answers to problems, guides learners to 
build increasingly complex networks of internally-coherent mental constructions and asks 
learners to determine whether those networks of ideas and beliefs are indeed coherent. Grounded 
in coherentism, learners are viewed as subjective agents with an inherent capacity to formulate 
coherent ideas and belief structures.  
 Alternatively, the phenomenological counselor educator assumes that the path to 
discovering correct answers to problems begins with rich descriptions provided by learners about 
the phenomenon under investigation, guides learners in the process of questioning, identifying, 
and investigating their immediate experience of a given phenomenon, and works with learners 
both to examine their own self-discovered evidence and to compare it to the experience of others 
investigating the same phenomenon. By moving the focus away from mental constructions and 
towards the direct exploration of any given conscious experience, the phenomenological 
approach asks counseling students to trade abstractions and mental constructions for experiential 
awareness and immediate apperceptions. Husserl held that everything a person is conscious of - 
referred to as intentionality - is subject to phenomenological investigation, including 
consciousness itself (Husserl, 1931). This includes ideas, thoughts, images, behaviors, acts of 
volition, and even understanding itself. Phenomenological learning takes place at this 
fundamental level of direct observation and apprehension - the foundation of the scientific 
method.  
 Phenomenological investigation thereby holds a middle ground that takes the reality of 
complex phenomena seriously without reducing that reality to a set of personal constructions. 
Learning need not be thought of as constructed to account for various subjective phenomena. 
Husserl (2000) - with his motto “back to the things themselves” (p. 168) - sought to escape the 
limits of subjective vagueness and arrive at some certainty of the nature of both world and self. 
There is indeed a world of experience to be discovered, and we can acquire intimate knowledge 
of it through direct, rigorous, and verifiable investigation. We can also learn how consciousness 
acts upon perception in such a way as to affect how persons view their own experiences. This 
idea presupposes that there are individual variations in how subjects perceive experiences and 
thereby justify beliefs, just as constructivism claims. However, the phenomenological 
perspective further notes that variations in this so-called act of constitution must be directly 
investigated and compared with the perceptions of others to determine why such variations occur 
and whether those variations signify a relevant distortion in perception or belief (Zaner, 1970). 
Truth Values: Between Idealism and Realism 
 Coherentism as an approach to belief justification is distinct from, but intimately related to, 
the coherence theory of truth that denies an objective or directly accessible external world 
(Ultanir, 2012). It thus rejects the correspondence theory of truth upheld by foundationalism, 
which asserts that truth denotes a correspondence between what is known and the precise nature 
of an absolute reality (Feldman, 2003; Russell, 1912). Guided by epistemological coherentism, 
constructivists assert that abandoning the correspondence theory of truth frees us to realize that 
truth is a subjective construction without any correspondence to a verifiable reality (Nola & 
Irzik, 2005). Constructivists thus highlight the virtually infinite number of creative ways in 
which knowledge structures can be coherently organized and thus deny any grounds for objective 
truth claims. Beyond rejecting the foundationalist requirement for evidentiary support in belief 
justification, constructivists also sponsor the viewpoint that objective evidence is not needed to 
justify a belief because truth itself is a subjective phenomenon. 
 This line of thought is a consequence of epistemological idealism, or the view that our 
knowledge of the world is mediated by mental representations or models of the world rather than 
being a direct depiction of the world as it is in-itself (Feldman, 2003). Aligned with this view, 
most constructivists maintain that what may be known about an object (e.g., an apple's color, 
shape, taste, and size) is strictly “in” the observer's mind rather than “in” the object because the 
objective world, though perhaps existing, remains inaccessible to our direct apprehension 
(Feldman, 2003; Phillips, 1995). In contrast, the epistemological realist position maintains that 
the physical world independent of the knower is directly accessible. This realism-idealism 
dispute is an epistemological restatement of the debate over Cartesian dualism, which tends to 
force a choice between the individual knower as arbiter of reality and the physical world as 
foundation of reality.  Most constructivists tend to deviate from a purely idealistic stance by 
acknowledging that the physical world exists while maintaining that the physical world should 
only be referenced in terms of how it frames human experience vis a vis the construction of 
mental representations, or mental models (Phillips, 1995; Schunk, 2012).  
 According to Nola and Irzik (2005), this results in a uniquely adapted version of the 
coherence theory of truth: that truth conditions of propositions can only be other propositions, 
which are derived from an ever-evolving construction of assimilated propositions. While this 
may sound confusing, it is actually a very simple principle that serves as a primary constructivist 
tenet, namely that: 
we can never compare either our experiences of, or our beliefs about, reality with how 
reality is because, in order to check whether our experiences or beliefs correspond with 
reality, further experiences or beliefs must always intervene. Thus, we can never have 
direct knowledge, or more strongly any knowledge at all, of how reality is (Nola & Irzik, 
2005, p. 149-150). 
In other words, knowledge according to constructivism is continually constructed by epistemic 
agents who are restricted to internal representations of the inaccessible external world. As such, 
knowledge can only ever be viable, not valid. This perspective is not new to constructivism, 
having long been upheld by various anti-realist advocates as the Inaccessibility of Reality 
Argument, or IRA (Nola & Irzik, 2005). While the credibility of this position has been largely 
undone by epistemologists in recent years (see Nola & Irzik, 2005), it has nonetheless continued 
to influence constructivist practices.  
 The issue of viability is apparent in terms of the practical consequence of a constructivist 
take on knowledge in the classroom. Through various educational practices, constructivism seeks 
to replace the notion of the teacher as the transmitter of correct knowledge of reality with a 
pedagogical approach that emphasizes the importance of adaptive and personalized teaching 
methods that fit student needs (Boghossian, 2009; Merrill, 1991). As previously noted, this 
transition was spurred by a legitimate and well-intentioned desire to place student needs and 
considerations at the center of the learning process. However, there are unintended consequences 
in basing truth claims on viability rather than validity. As stated by Nola and Irzik (2005), “the 
conflation of knowledge with belief and the replacement of truth by viability [has] resulted in the 
loss of the idea of a right and wrong answer”, quite often leaving constructivist instructors 
“reluctant to tell their students that their representations may sometimes be misconceptions, and 
that their constructions can be misconstructions” (p. 177).  
 Such equivocation of knowledge with belief is not something to be taken lightly. Insofar as 
there are substantial bodies of counseling research and knowledge that students must acquire to 
become effective practitioners, such an equivocation may leave many students underprepared or 
otherwise confused (Sewall, 2000). The learning needs of novices are vastly different from those 
of established professionals and the methods of inquiry used in a field of study may not 
necessarily be the best means of teaching its associated content (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 
2006). Epistemological principles can influence the welfare of learners through an instructor's 
philosophical allegiance to a certain mindset, as when constructivist practices result in the 
development of naïve mental models rather than accurate, or well-articulated, mental models 
(Merrienboer & Kirschner, 2007; Wilkinson & Dewell, 2019).   
 Naïve mental models tend to reflect “misunderstandings or misconceptions where learners 
are unaware of the underlying relationships between elements” (Kirschner, 2009, p. 151). In a 
similar vein, Husserl (1965) made consistent reference to the importance of overcoming the 
natural attitude through a process of relentless investigation into our own primary 
preconceptions, presuppositions, and schema. An integral part of Husserl’s (1931) method 
included instructions on how to move out of the natural attitude toward the goal of examining 
prepredicative or preconceptual experience (i.e. sense experience independent of judgment). It is 
in this mode that we can grasp how “the real world indeed exists” (Husserl, 1931, p. 14) by 
means of our direct, intuitive apperception of experience. While the world is indeed there - all by 
itself and on its own - phenomenology indicates that the world cannot be divorced from the 
constituting consciousness of the investigator, of which it is an integral part.   
 The result of this line of inquiry is not a declaration of a reality independent of, and without 
regard to, the world as it is. From a phenomenological stance, determination of reality is not a 
primary concern since such determinations are subject to a plethora of preconceptions and 
judgments. Husserl instead chose to focus on the primacy of experience. As such, 
phenomenology is a transcendence of both subjectivism and objectivism that allows the world to 
be there as it has always been but refines our understanding of it to include subjectivity itself. 
This involves arriving at original concepts that are adequately adjusted to the ground of pre-
predicative experience and requires stepping outside of the natural attitude (Husserl, 1931). From 
this perspective, it is unsurprising that the experimental psychologists Herrnstein and Boring 
(1965) described the phenomenological method as “the most primitive kind of observation of 
experience that it is possible for man to achieve” (p. 611).  
 Locating a middle ground between realist and idealist perspectives was precisely the task 
set forth by Husserl (1931). The phenomenological shift involves accurately describing world, 
mind, and conscious perception in a disciplined and rigorously honest fashion (Hanna, 
Wilkinson, & Givens, 2017). It should be noted that the phenomenological approach also allows 
for an inquiry based on reason that eschews the exercise of power. Since phenomenology allows 
the world to be as it is without changing anything (Husserl, 1970), the nature of the world is not 
dependent on our pronouncements of it. By clarifying and refining our perceptions, beliefs, and 
understandings of world and consciousness, phenomenological inquiry allows knowledge to 
emerge that is not limited by cultural frameworks that mold reality according to tradition, 
zeitgeist, expediency, or psychological need. Phenomenological methodology allows an egress 
from views that are bound by such self-referential tendencies, which makes it a suitable 
framework for confronting issues related to power and oppression.  
Practical Considerations for Counselor Educators 
 It is important for counselor educators to consider the way in which positivist, 
constructivist, and phenomenological pedagogies differ in practice. We will briefly examine 
these pedagogies in light of two important areas of counselor training, namely theory acquisition 
and concept formation. 
Theory Acquisition 
 A positivist approach to teaching counseling theory focuses on the scientific evidence for or 
against the veracity of any given theory (Rosenshine, 2009). In this respect, the growth of 
evidence-based counseling practice reflects the positivist view that practitioners should be held 
accountable for providing those counseling services that have been empirically validated through 
research to meet the needs of individual clients (Norcross & Wampold, 2011). Foundationalism, 
seeking the verifiable basis for evidential truth, requires proof of efficacy. As such, counselor 
educators inclined towards positivism should, to maintain epistemological congruence, train 
students to closely examine the evidentiary basis for particular theories rather than choose 
theories based on ideological affiliation or preference. 
 A constructivist approach to teaching counseling theory focuses on alignment between 
personal meaning and theoretical worldviews. Recognizing that all counseling theories are 
equally effective in creating client change (Wampold, 2001), many counselor educators have 
chosen to embrace a personal-fit model of theory acquisition (Guiffrida, 2005; Kottler, 2002; 
Spruill & Benshoff, 2000). This is clearly a constructivist practice insofar as the subjective 
worldview of the student aligns with a viable, theory-based interpretation of psychological 
experience (Wilkinson & Hanna, 2016). Coherentism, seeking the internal consistency of belief 
structures, requires proof of alignment between subjective belief and counseling practice. As 
such, counselor educators inclined toward constructivism should, to maintain epistemological 
congruence, train students in theories by examining the correspondence between theory-based 
worldviews and the subjective worldviews of students.  
 A phenomenological approach to teaching theories focuses on psychological phenomena 
that counseling theories seek to explain. Husserl’s (2000) motto “back to the things themselves” 
(p. 168) indicates that phenomenology is primarily concerned with immediate apperceptions 
rather than mere theoretical speculations. It views theoretical frameworks as abstractions that can 
lead students to oversimplify complex and interconnected psychological processes (Wilkinson & 
Hanna, 2016). Rather than teach students each theory separately, phenomenological pedagogy 
highlights assumptions made by each theory and explores the similarities and differences therein. 
For example, behavior, cognition, and emotion-based theories each claim primacy in terms of the 
therapeutic change process. Rejecting this supposition, a phenomenological approach asks 
students to examine the parallels among behavior, cognition, and affect as manifest in their 
subjective experience (Wilkinson & Hanna, 2016). The result is that students learn that each 
theory has value in particular situations (akin to the evidence-based view of positivism) via a 
process that forces them to challenge assumptions and deconstruct their subjective view of 
experience (akin to the meaning-making view of constructivism).  
Concept Formation 
 A positivist approach to teaching counseling concepts focuses on valid and well-established 
points of scientific consensus. Ideas should be clearly defined and explicated based upon the 
standard definitions within the field and in accordance with the most recent empirical evidence. 
The validity of counseling concepts for positivists is therefore found within major theories and 
conceptual models that have been rigorously scrutinized and tested. For example, training 
students in the cognitive-behavioral view of automatic thoughts, intermediate beliefs, and core 
beliefs may involve identifying definitions, showcasing their usefulness by teaching student how 
to implement particular models of cognition, and perhaps using a case vignette to highlight how 
these concepts come together to inform counseling practice. The focus remains steadfastly on 
ensuring students learn the accurate definitions, models, and practical applications of various 
concepts in an organized and proficient manner.  
 A constructivist approach to teaching counseling concepts focuses on viability of 
interpretations. Constructivists recognize that student interpretations are often inaccurate and so 
promote teacher guidance as a normative practice (Duschl & Duncan, 2009). However, even as 
subjective experience becomes a central part of exploring concepts in constructivism, the 
emphasis remains on cognitive interpretations such as explanations and implications. Once 
again, students might be asked to consider the relationship between automatic thoughts and core 
beliefs through a cognitive-behavioral lens. Students discuss how they might explain the 
relationship between these concepts, or even share stories about their own struggles with 
negative self-talk. Additionally, the downward arrow technique might be introduced such that 
students discuss how this process works and when it might be beneficial. An experiential element 
is often involved, whereby instructors engage students by discussing how they understand 
automatic thoughts and core beliefs in order to construct a more refined sense of conceptual 
interconnectedness. Yet it remains a conceptual process, addressing implications and explaining 
the interdependency of concepts in a top-down fashion. 
 A phenomenological approach to teaching counseling concepts focuses on the immediate 
experiences of students. It does not assume that core beliefs, as a theoretical construct, is a 
beneficial notion for understanding self-valuation (Wilkinson & Hanna, 2016). Students are 
instead asked to examine concepts in terms of the psychological phenomena found in their 
immediate apperception. In other words, students are led to explore their own experience of, for 
example, automatic thoughts as a directly accessible phenomenon. Rather than explain automatic 
thoughts as “things that the patient tells himself” (Beck, 1967, p. 321), an instructor may have 
students recall a recent embarrassing experience in vivid detail and explore whether self-
deprecating internal statements arise alongside the recollection. Students might then be asked to 
engage in exercises such as the call and response writing assignment (see Wilkinson & Dewell, 
2019 for details) to examine how abstracted concepts can be deconstructed and thus translated 
into a more concrete, experiential phenomenon. This is a descriptive and bottom-up process, 
requiring the activation of direct experiences such that students learn about concepts through 
direct apperception rather than abstract construction.  
 Arguably, this bottom-up approach may also be a necessary component of empathy 
training. If it is indeed possible to grow the empathy of counselors-in-training (Ridley et al. 
2011; Ivey et al., 1968), then it seems beneficial to consider whether the training process might 
require experiential elements that are grounded in deconstruction. Does empathy grow as a 
consequence of personal factors beyond the reach of counselor educators, or are there creative 
techniques that might prove efficacious (Bayne & Jangha, 2016)? We would assert that empathy 
training coalesces with a phenomenological pedagogy that seeks to transcend the view of 
empathy as merely a cognitive or behavioral act within the natural attitude, putting students in 
direct contact with their own experience of empathic attunement in various training situations. 
The descriptive aspect of phenomenological inquiry, grounded within foundherentist principles 
that reject subject-object distinctions, may prove fertile soil for growing new approaches to 
empathy training that go beyond theoretical speculations and subjective explanations. 
Discussion 
 The aims of constructivist and phenomenological pedagogies are not mutually exclusive, as 
both seek to address shortcomings in traditional didactic approaches by making the experience of 
students central to educational endeavors. However, it is important to distinguish between their 
epistemological assumptions since those assumptions lead to pedagogical consequences. 
Constructivism embraces the positions of coherentism and idealism to overcome the 
consequences of foundationalism and realism within positivist teaching approaches. 
Phenomenology take a different stance. As a bridge between the positions of realism and 
idealism, as well as coherentism and foundationalism, phenomenology stands as a distinct 
endeavor that draws upon elements of both constructivism and positivism.  
 A merging of constructivist and phenomenological approaches could be particularly 
effective vis à vis flipped classrooms, which have been described as a constructivism-inspired 
approach seeking to “address the gap between didactic education and clinical practice 
performance” (Hawks, 2014; p. 264).  Typical flipped classrooms involve having students 
observe pre-recorded video lectures before class and engage in more intensive group activities 
during class (Bates, Almekdash, & Gilchrest-Dunnam, 2016; Moran & Milsom, 2015). As 
discussed in the previous sections, the phenomenological approach to theory acquisition and 
concept formation focuses on examining the immediate experience of mental health phenomena 
and interconnected mental health processes. By providing students with traditional coverage 
(e.g., video-recorded lectures) of course content outside of class, instructors can use face-to-face 
class time as an opportunity to teach students phenomenological inquiry methods and to provide 
guidance in assessing as well as deconstructing challenging concepts (Wilkinson & Dewell, 
2019).  
 Empirical research is needed to establish the relative merits of phenomenological methods 
as a supplement to constructivist practices. Researchers might consider developing instructional 
activities based on phenomenological principles and practices outlined in this article and others 
(see Wilkinson & Dewell, 2019; Wilkinson & Hanna, 2016) that can be tested in both content 
and supervision-based classes. The review of epistemological positions in this article thus serves 
to elucidate some of the core presuppositions that inform instructional practices as well as to 
provide a foundation for considering alternative approaches. We maintain that phenomenology 
can serve as a valuable pedagogical tool to enhance counselor education precisely because it 
occupies a middle ground between foundationalism and coherentism as well as realism and 
idealism. As such, it provides a unique epistemological frame of reference to guide the 
development of innovative instructional strategies, methods, and practices in counselor 
education. Considering these arguments, perhaps a new professional discourse on positivist, 
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